An enhanced symmetric-key based 5G-AKA protocol by Munilla, Jorge et al.
An Enhanced Symmetric-key Based 5G-AKA Protocol
Jorge Munillaa,∗, Mike Burmesterb, Raquel Barcoa
aE.T.S.I.Telecomuicación. Universidad de Málaga, 29071, Málaga, Spain.
bDept. of Computer Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-4530, USA.
Abstract
5G technology is called to support the next generation of wireless communi-
cations and realize the “Internet of Everything” through its mMTC (massive
Machine-Type-Communications) service. The recently standardized 5G-AKA
protocol is intended to deal with security and privacy issues detected in earlier
generations. Nevertheless, several 5G-AKA shortcomings have been reported,
including a possibly excessive computational complexity for many IoT devices.
To address these, a promising lightweight 2-pass authentication and key agree-
ment (AKA) protocol for 5G mobile communications has recently been pro-
posed by Braeken. Compared to the 5G-AKA protocol, this does not require
the use of public key encryption. This paper analyzes the security claims of
Braeken’s protocol and shows that it does not provide full unlinkability, but
only session unlinkability, and is (still) subject to Linkability of AKA Failure
Messages (LFM) attacks. We propose solutions to such problems and prove
that symmetric-key based protocols cannot offer higher privacy protection lev-
els without compromising availability. We then describe an enhanced version of
this protocol with modifications that address these vulnerabilities and support
forward secrecy, which is a desirable feature for low-cost IoT devices.
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1. Introduction
Recent advances in wireless and mobile technologies have led to massive
growth in mobile services. By the end of 2019, more than 5.2 billion people
were subscribed to mobile services, accounting for 67% of the global population.
Although currently the 4th Generation (4G) mobile technology is the dominant5
technology, the evolving 5th Generation (5G) technology is gaining pace and is
expected to account for over 20% of global connections by 2025 [1]. The Internet
of Things (IoT) networks will be an integral part of the 5G evolution through
the new mMTC (massive Machine Type Communications) service, which im-
proves the existing NB-IoT (Narrow Band-IoT) and LTE-M (Long Term Evo-10
lution Cat-M1) services introduced in 2015. With the number of global IoT
connections expected to more than double, to almost 25 billion, between 2019
and 2025, mMTC is intended to support connection densities of up to one mil-
lion devices/km2 and ultra-low cost devices, with ultra-low cost operation and
maintenance (battery life of 10-15 years) [2].15
Securing mobile technologies is a major challenge. Privacy issues detected
in earlier mobile network generations have increased the distrust in this tech-
nology and security has been revealed to be a crucial issue that may derail or,
at least, delay large-scale deployment. The 3GPP consortium (3rd Generation
Partnership Project [3]), which designed the 3G and 4G standards and is now20
involved in the development of 5G, has already defined a security architecture
for 5G systems [4]. Security and privacy are mainly guaranteed by the Au-
thentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols: 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA,
which mutually authenticate subscribers and operator networks. These pro-
tocols have been revised and standardized to improve protection against prior25
privacy attacks and, in particular, the well-known “IMSI (International Mobile
Subscriber Identity) catcher” attacks [5, 6], which compromised the privacy of
subscribers by exploiting the fact that their identities were not protected during
transmission. Thus, the main novelty of these AKA protocols is the inclusion of
randomized public key encryption to protect the subscribers’ identity. Unfor-30
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tunately, despite these changes, it has been shown that these protocols remain
subject to different privacy attacks [7, 8]. As a consequence, variants of the 5G-
AKA protocols have been proposed in the literature by Koutsos [7] and Braeken
et al. [9].
These variants still rely on a public key encryption, which could be an issue35
for ultra-low cost IoT devices, so that, recently, Braeken published an efficient
and promising lightweight 2-pass AKA protocol for 5G networks [10]. This is
symmetric-key based and uses the exclusive OR (XOR) operation for obfusca-
tion and a cryptographic hash function for authentication. It is claimed to be
resistant to all known attacks in the literature and offers anonymity, unlinkabil-40
ity, mutual authentication and confidentiality.
This paper analyzes the security of the Braeken AKA protocol and en-
hances/refines some of its security claims. In particular, we show that it is
still vulnerable to location confidentiality attacks that exploit the Linkability
of Failure Messages (LFM) and that it only provides session unlinkability [11],45
and not full unlinkability. We then propose solutions for these problems and
show that one may have to compromise availability to achieve full unlinkabil-
ity. We prove that this is not the consequence of a faulty design but the result
of using symmetric-key protection. There is a fundamental trade-off between
privacy (unlinkability) and availability [12] that can only be circumvented by50
using asymmetric protection.
Finally, we present an enhanced version of Braeken’s protocol that overcomes
the described weaknesses and supports forward-secrecy. This security feature,
which is not provided by the current version of the protocol, guarantees that
session keys are protected if, in the future, long-term keys get compromised.55
This is particularly important for low-cost IoT devices that may be deployed in
unsupervised sites and whose low cost does not guarantee top-level anti-tamper
protection.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper are: (a) the analysis of the
Braeken lightweight 2-pass AKA protocol for 5G networks, pointing out its60
limitations and weaknesses, (b) the required modifications to address such weak-
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nesses, and (c) an enhanced version of this protocol that includes these mod-
ifications and provides forward secrecy. With these goals, the outline of the
paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the 5G-AKA protocol and the main 5G
modules involved in the authentication procedure. Section 3 describes in detail65
the Braeken 2-pass symmetric-key AKA protocol. Section 4 analyzes this pro-
tocol focusing on privacy issues, and Section 5 proposes an enhanced version
of the protocol that is resistant to forward-secrecy attacks and discusses the
modifications introduced. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Security Architecture and Procedures for 5G70
The security architecture and procedures for 5G wireless systems are defined
in the technical specification 3GPP TS 33.501 [4]. This section summarizes the
main aspects extracted from the specifications and related documents.
2.1. Architecture
Figure 1 illustrates the 5G communication architecture, with three main75
parties: the User Equipment (UE), Serving Network (SN) and Home Network
(HN), indicating the most relevant functions and modules (from a security point
of view) that can be found in each of them.
Figure 1: 5G communication architecture.
The UE contains the Mobile Equipment (ME) of the subscriber, typically
a smartphone or an IoT device equipped with a Universal Subscriber Identity80
Module (USIM) that has cryptographic capabilities and stores the subscriber’s
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credentials. Plastic SIM cards have been used traditionally but their cost, which
includes a SIM card reader and the difficulty associated with their substitution,
make them unsuitable for IoT devices. In such cases, embedded SIMs (eSIM),
implemented on chips where the credentials are provisioned remotely, are pre-85
ferred. HN belongs to the subscriber’s operator, manages subscriber information
at the UDM (Unified Data Management) and handles authentication requests
at the AUSF (Authentication Server Function). Finally, the SN provides the UE
with physical access (wireless) to the network. SN contains the base stations,
called gNB (Next Generation NodeB), carries out confidentiality and integrity90
functions of the data exchanged with UE, using keys derived from an anchor key
KSEAF supplied by HN and stored in the Security Anchor Function (SEAF), and
also provides connection management services such as registration, reachability
and mobility, implemented in the Access and Mobility Management Function
(AMF) (similar to the Mobility Management Entity, MME, in 4G). The SN may95
or may not belong to the same operator as HN (as in roaming). From a threat
model point of view, ME uses an untrusted wireless channel to communicate
with SN, while SN shares a trusted (according to Clause 5.9.3 [4]), possibly
wired, channel with HN.
2.2. The 5G AKA protocol (sub-clause 6.1.3.2)100
A primary authentication is compulsory for all devices regardless of the ser-
vice or network access these require (agnostic access network). The purpose of
this primary authentication and key agreement is to enable mutual authenti-
cation between the UE and the network and provide keying material (KSEAF )
that can be used between the UE and the SN. A secondary authentication, in-105
tended for services provided over 5G, such as authenticated access to corporate
data, is also possible in 5G but is optional.
For the primary authentication, 3GPP proposes two authentication and key
agreement protocols: EAP-AKA and 5G-AKA. Here, we describe 5G-AKA since
it is the most recent and used as a guideline by Braeken. EAP-AKA is quite110
similar, changing some exchanged messages and the key derivation slightly. For
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more details, we refer the reader to [13] and Subclause 6.1.3.1 of [4].
The 5G-AKA protocol employs the exclusive-or operation “⊕” for one-time
pad encryption, a public key encryption function encpkHN (·), with public key
pkHN and secret key stored in HN, a key derivation function (KDF ), based115
on SHA256 [14, 15], and seven one-way keyed authentication and key genera-
tion functions: f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, and f1∗, f5∗. The standard does not specify
an implementation for these keyed functions but only security requirements. In
particular, they should be cryptographically secure and mutually independent.
That is, without knowing the key, their outputs should be practically indis-120
tinguishable from independent random functions, and it should be infeasible
to determine any part of the key, or the operator variant configuration field,
by manipulating their inputs and examining their straightforward or combined
outputs. An example set of authentication and key generation functions, called
the MILENAGE algorithms [16], has been developed by the 3GPP partners.125
The 5G-AKA protocol involves the three entities: UE, SN and HN, with dif-
ferent elements within them, as explained, carrying out separate tasks. How-
ever, to simplify the description of our protocol, since SN and HN are assumed
to be trusted and securely connected, we model them as a single entity, with
SN being part of HN — see Figure 2. The USIM (at UE) stores privately: a130
Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI), which uniquely identifies UE, a long-
term secret key k, which is different for each subscriber, the public key pkHN of
HN, and a sequence number SQN , used to synchronize UE and HN. These val-
ues are shared with HN, which stores them and the secret key skHN of the public
key cryptosystem in a secured database. Since SQN is incremented separately135
on UE and HN, we distinguish the stored values by SQNUE and SQNHN . Ran-
domized public key encryption (with ne a random bitstring) is used to conceal
the subscriber identity: SUCI = encpkHN (SUPI, ne), corresponding, in prac-
tice, to the “Scheme-Output” field within the SUCI packet, which also includes
information needed for routing and setting the protection scheme. Thus, the140
SUPI is never sent in the clear to prevent the above-mentioned “IMSI catcher
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i) MAC′ = MAC
ii) SQN∗HN < SQNUE
If i) ∧ ii) then:
set: SQNUE ← SQNHN ,
compute: KSEAF , RES
∗
3a. RES∗
If XRES∗ 6=RES∗ then abort;
else select fresh GUTInew and
compute f2(k,R)⊕GUTInew4∗. f2(k,R)⊕GUTInew
Unmask to get fresh GUTI
If ¬i) then ‘Mac Failure’
3b. ‘Mac Failure’
If i)∧¬ii) then compute:
MACS,AUTS 3c. ‘Sync Failure’, AUTS
If MACS in AUTS is correct
then: extract SQNUE and
set: SQNHN ← SQNUE+1
Figure 2: The 5G AKA protocol (using the descriptions in Table 1).
be used to identify the UE. This is a temporary identity assigned and sent to
UE by HN after a successful authentication run, which replaces the encrypted
SUPI, and avoids a public key encryption and a random number generation.145
The flows of 5G-AKA are sketched in Figure 2, using the acronyms in Table 1,
and briefly explained next (“⇒” stands for “send” and “←” for assignment):
1. Identifier Request/Registration Request. UE ⇒ HN : GUTI or SUCI.
Upon receiving a GUTI, HN extracts the SUPI from (the stored values in)
7
5G Acronyms Description
SUPI, GUTI Subscription Permanent Identifier , Globally Unique Temporary Identifier
SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier. SUCI = encpkHN (SUPI, ne)
AMF , SNname Authentication Management Field , Serving Network Name
R, SQNUE/SQNHN random challenge of HN , Sequence Number of UE/HN
MAC,MACS f1(k, 〈SQNHN‖R‖AMF 〉), f∗1(k, 〈SQNUE‖R‖AMF 〉)
CK, IK, AK/AK∗ cipher-, integrity-, authentication-key: f3(k,R), f4(k,R), f5(k,R)/f∗5(k,R)
AUTN,AUTS 〈SQNHN ⊕AK ‖AMF‖MAC〉, 〈SQNUE ⊕AK∗ ‖AMF‖MACS〉
RES, xRES actual and expected response, f2(k,R)
RES∗/XRES∗ actual/expected derivated response, KDF (〈CK‖IK〉, 〈SNname‖R‖XRES〉)
KAUSF authentication server key: KDF (〈CK‖IK〉, 〈SNname‖ SQN ⊕AK〉)
KSEAF security anchor key KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
Table 1: 5G acronyms and their descriptions.
its database. If a SUPI was received, then HN decrypts SUCI using its150
private key skHN to get SUPI.
2. Challenge. HN ⇒ UE : 〈R,AUTN〉, where R is a fresh nonce,
AUTN = 〈SQNHN ⊕ AK ‖AMF‖MAC〉, with AK = f5(k,R),
MAC = f1(k, 〈SQNHN‖R‖AMF 〉). HN updates the counter
SQNHN ← SQNHN + 1.155
Upon receiving this message, UE computes AK, extracts SQNHN from the
challenge, and checks: (i.) MAC for correctness and, (ii.) SQNHN for fresh-
ness: SQNUE < SQNHN < SQNUE + ∆. ∆ is used to prevent desynchro-
nization attacks by forcing the counter to wrap around.
3. Response. Three cases can be distinguished depending of the checks.160
a.) (i.∧ ii.): UE⇒ HN: RES∗ = f2(k,R), and UE sets SQNUE ← SQNHN .
b.) (¬i.): UE ⇒ HN: Mac Failure.
c.) (i∧¬ii.): UE⇒ HN: 〈Sync Failure, AUTS〉, where AUTS is computed as
AUTS = 〈SQNUE ⊕ AK∗ ‖AMF‖MACS〉, with AK∗ = f5∗(k,R)
and MACS = f1∗(k, 〈SQNUE‖R‖AMF 〉). HN computes AK∗, extracts165
SQNUE , computes MACS, and if correct, sets SQNHN ← SQNUE + 1.
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In the first case, HN is authenticated (the MAC is correct and the challenge
is fresh) and the response RES∗ is sent. HN compares the received response
RES∗ with the expected response XRES∗, and if correct, the authentication
protocol has ended successfully. In the second case, the authentication is170
aborted because the message authentication codes (MAC) cannot be verified.
In the last case, a desynchronization is detected and SQNUE is sent for re-
syncrhonization. The authentication protocol must be repeated with these
re-synchronized values.
At the end of a successful run, UE and HN share the anchor key KSEAF ,175
from which session keys for the communication between the subscriber and
the HN are derived. Authentication is implicit [17], meaning that it is only
effective and confirmed when the parties succeed in exchanging messages using
the derived keys. The standard does not specify any additional key confirmation
round, although there exists a procedure that UE and SN (AMF) has to carry180
out to finally establish the security context (“NAS Security Mode Command
Procedure”). If the security context is successfully established, then HN can
provide SN with a fresh GUTI (using masked values to prevent IMSI-catching
attacks).
2.3. A Brief security analysis of the 5G-AKA protocol185
Although they are sometimes underspecified, as pointed out in [17], we can
list the following integrity and privacy goals for 5G-AKA according to [4]:
SG1. Mutual authentication (implicit) between UE and SN, and UE and HN.
SG2. SN is authorized by HN.
SG3. Confidentiality for KSEAF even if the attacker learns session keys estab-190
lished in other sessions (previous or consequent).
SG4. Anonymity. SUPI and SQN shall remain secret in the presence of a
passive attacker in order to guarantee activity privacy.
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SG5. Unlinkability (user location confidentiality and user untraceability) against
passive adversaries. An attacker cannot deduce the presence of a sub-195
scriber in a certain area or whether different services are delivered to the
same user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
It is not difficult to see that 5G-AKA is subject to the LFM attacks [18, 19].
This attack exploits the fact that in the event of an erroneous authentication
challenge, the reason for the failure is exposed to the attacker; i.e., either a200
MAC Failure or a Sync Failure, so that the attacker can link two different ses-
sions and identify a target user. In this attack, the adversary, after eavesdrop-
ping on a session of a target UE, acts as a fake base station (active attack) and
replies the second message (authentication challenge: R,AUTN) to an UE: if
the response of UE is Sync Failure then the target is the same user, while if the205
response is MAC Failure, then the target is some other user. This simple attack
compromises subscription location, allowing, as an extension, user-traceability,
although it does not contradict the SG5 goal, as this protection is only required
against passive adversaries.
3. The Braeken symmetric-key based 5G AKA protocol210
Braeken’s protocol [10] implements a symmetric-key AKA between UE and
HN (see Figure 3). It is preceded by a registration phase, where HN securely
shares the parameters id,K, n with UE, with id the identity of UE, K a long-
term secret key and n the sequence number (corresponding to SUPI, k and
SQN in 5G-AKA). HN also has a master key km, and a temporary random key215
kn. These keys are used to compute:
an = id⊕ h(km, kn), bn = an ⊕ km ⊕ kn, c = h(km, id),
where h is a cryptographic hash function. The parameter c can be seen [10]
as a certificate for the subscriber’s identity and replaces pkHN , while an, bn,
which are updated in each phase of the authentication procedure, represent the220
temporary identity of the subscriber (replacing the GUTI).
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When the registration phase is completed, the parties are ready to initiate
the authentication procedure. This has two operation modes: synchronized and
de-synchronized. In the synchronized mode, the sequence number n is used and
accepted if it is within a certain margin (as in 5G-AKA). In the de-synchronized225
mode, additional values are exchanged so that HN can learn the value of the
sequence number that UE is using. HN will accept this value provided that it
is higher than the locally stored pre-used value for that UE.
In the synchronized mode, UE sends to HN the message [an, bn, hn], with
hn = h(K, id, c, an, bn, n), and then increments n ← n + 1. Otherwise (de-230
synchronized), UE generates a random number rn, computes and includes
yn = an ⊕ id ⊕ rn and zn = n ⊕ h(K, rn, yn) in the message and computes
a modified hn = h(K, id, c, an, bn, n, zn).
When HN receives the message, it computes the temporary value
kn ← an ⊕ bn ⊕ km and finds id ← an ⊕ h(km, kn) and c ← h(km, id).235
Next, HN looks up in its database the secret key K and the sequence number
nid of the subscriber id. In the synchronized mode, HN computes
hn∗ ← h(K, id, c, an, bn, n∗) with n∗∈ {nid, . . . , nid+∆}, ∆ a predefined thresh-
old, and checks if any of these matches the received value: hn∗ = hn. In the
de-synchronized mode HN retrieves rn ← an⊕id⊕yn and n∗ ← zn⊕h(K, rn, yn)240
and computes hn∗ ← h(K, id, c, an, bn, n∗, zn). It then checks if this value
matches the received value hn∗ = hn and that n
∗ ≥ nid. If the checks are
correct, the parameters are updated: nid ← n∗ + 1, two random values are
drawn: kn+1, fn+1, with the former used to compute an+1 ← id⊕ h(km, kn+1)
and bn+1 ← an+1 ⊕ km ⊕ kn+1. These values are then masked to get:245
η ← h(fn+1, c) ⊕ an+1 and µ ← h(c, fn+1) ⊕ bn+1, and the anchor key is com-
puted as KSEAF ← h(K, fn+1, η, µ, n+1). The values [α, β, η, µ] are sent, where
α = c⊕ fn+1 and β = h(KSEAF , an+1, bn+1, id, c). This message is received by
UE, which extracts fn+1 ← α ⊕ c, and then computes the updated values:
an+1 ← h(fn+1, c)⊕η and bn+1 ← h(c, fn+1)⊕µ. UE also computes the anchor250
key KSEAF ← h(K, fn+1, η, µ, n+1) and β′ ← h(KSEAF , an+1, bn+1, id, c), and
checks if it matches with the received value: β′ = β. If correct, UE replaces
11
Figure 3: The Braeken AKA protocol
[an, bn] with [an+1, bn+1].
Thus, the UE updates [an, bn] only after a successful authentication, while
n is updated after the first message is sent (even if the authentication is not255
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successful). For HN, nid is the sole updated parameter, and only when the
checks are correct.
Finally, we note that the Braeken protocol does not specify how UE enters
the synchronized or de-synchronized mode. We will address this matter later.
4. Analysis of the Braeken symmetric-key based 5G AKA protocol260
Braeken’s protocol is claimed to offer anonymity, unlinkability, confidential-
ity and mutual authentication, and in particular, resistance to all known 5G
AKA attacks. The security has been formally verified using RUBIN logic [20].
Compared to other AKA proposals, it is highly efficient, requiring just two
flows, and relying exclusively on symmetric-key based operations, making this265
protocol especially suitable for IoT devices.
In this section, we shall cryptanalyze the Braeken protocol, pointing out
several security aspects that could result in vulnerabilities for certain practi-
cal implementations, and discussing some of its security features; in partic-
ular, those regarding unlinkability and forward-secrecy. We shall show that270
Braeken’s protocol only provides “session unlinkability” and is subject to LFM
and forward-secrecy attacks. Forward-secrecy was not a goal of the original de-
sign still, it is a highly desirable security feature for IoT devices, which cannot
afford top-level anti-tamper protection and may be deployed at unsupervised
sites. An enhanced version of this protocol that implements solutions for the275
identified vulnerabilities and includes forward-secrecy protection is described in
the next section.
4.1. Implicit authentication and replay attacks
The authentication of UE is implicit, and therefore, the protocol is subject
to replay attacks. In fact, if an adversary intercepts the message (synchronized280
or de-synchronised) sent by UE, or gets it by using a fake base station, and
re-transmits it later to HN before UE and HN have completed a new authen-
tication protocol, then HN will accept it as valid and generate a KSEAF . This
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vulnerability, shared with the 5G-AKA protocol but with the implicit authen-
tication of HN (see Section 2), does not go further because the adversary is not285
able to generate the session key, but in certain situations, the attack may cause
functionality problems since the session remains open until a period of inactivity
is detected [17]. Since this vulnerability cannot be exploited and can only be
prevented by including additional communication flows, we do not propose to
address it in the enhanced version.290
4.2. Master key and offline brute force attacks
The Braeken protocol uses a master key (km) that is shared implicitly with
all users. This is a potential vulnerability that may expose the entire system to
an offline brute force attack: an adversary could register an authorized device
(or compromise a genuine one), getting access to id and c = h(km, id), and295
then perform an offline brute force attack to obtain the key km. This attack’s
effectiveness is inversely proportional to the length of the key so that it can be
prevented by assuring that km is sufficiently long.
4.3. Vulnerability to LFM attacks
Because of the different formats between UE’s messages in the synchronized300
and de-synchronized modes, Braeken’s protocol shares with the 5G-AKA pro-
tocol (see Section 2.3) the LFM vulnerability. The way to address this is to
make the synchronized and de-synchronized messages have the same format so
that a passive adversary cannot distinguish them. For this solution, two new
values A,B are included in the message exchanged in the synchronized mode:305
[an, bn, A,B, hn], with A = T [h(K, an))] and B a random number, that have
the same bit length as yn and zn, respectively, where T is the truncation or
padding of random bits to reach the desired length. HN must then check the
value A to determine if the received message corresponds to the synchronized
or de-synchronized mode.310
This solution, however, to be effective, also requires: (a) to address unlink-
ability, which is discussed in the next section, and (b) to define the logic that
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leads UE to select a particular operation mode appropriately. In fact, if this
selection was based, as in 5G-AKA, on an unmasked response message from HN
that specified the mode, then LFM attacks would still be possible. Thus, we315
alternatively propose that UE uses a counter to determine the operation mode;
i.e. the de-synchronized mode is activated if there are more than ∆ incomplete
sessions since the last complete execution. This also avoids the inclusion of new
(Failure) messages.
4.4. Privacy issues320
The Braeken protocol offers 3GPP unlikability protection (Section 2.2, SG5)
for subscriber location privacy under passive attacks. In this section, we discuss
the limitations of this protection against active attacks.
In both the synchronized and de-synchronized modes of operation, the val-
ues an, bn are repeated if the authentication is not successful. As a result, an325
(active) adversary that gets these values can trace UE by checking that the same
values an, bn are used, violating location privacy. This linking (traceability) of
messages is possible until the protocol is completed and the values an, bn are
updated. As a result, the Braeken protocol does not provide full unlinkability
but only a weaker version of unlinkability defined in [21, 11] as session unlink-330
ability. With session unlinkability, two interrogations of a UE cannot be linked
if, either the first one completed successfully, or an intermediate interrogation
completed successfully.
To get full-unlinkability, these values must be randomized in each session.
A proposed solution is then to replace the values an and bn with randomized335
versions a∗n and b
∗
n that are masked as follows:
a∗n = an ⊕ h(K, rn1), b∗n = bn ⊕ h(K, rn2),
with rn1, rn2 nonces generated by UE. Then, for every pair (id
∗,K∗) in its
database, HN has to compute k∗n = a
∗
n⊕h(K∗, rn1)⊕ b∗n⊕h(K∗, rn2)⊕km and
check if id∗= a∗n ⊕ h(K∗, rn1)⊕ h(km, k∗n).340
This solution achieves unlinkability but has a computational cost that could
compromise availability if the number of pairs (id,K) is large. This problem
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cannot be avoided when using symmetric-key protection mechanisms. If UE uses
randomized symmetric-key encryption (EK(id, rn1), rn1) for identification, then
HN has to check the received value for each pair (id,K) in its database. Alter-345
natively, if HK shared a symmetric master key Km with all UEs, so that these
could use Km to cipher its identities, then we would face the problem already
described in Section 4.2 (without requiring brute-force computation). As shown
in [12], with symmetric-key based architectures there is a trade-off between pri-
vacy and availability, and any attempt to improve privacy unavoidable impacts350
on the protection against DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.
For full unlinkability, UE must be able to send to HN a randomized encryp-
tion of its identifier id, that does not require any (fresh) input from HN (the
adversary can block or forge such messages), and HN must be able to decrypt it
without knowing in advance which UE sent it. If Fkey(id, rn) is this encryption,355
where F a pseudo-random function, then HN, and only HN, must be able to
recover the identifier id, for every UE. The capability of “inverting” F corre-
sponds to a trapdoor, that only HN should possess. The key that UE uses for
the encryption cannot be used for decryption and therefore can be a public key.
Consequently, F must be an asymmetric encryption function.360
We conclude that session unlinkability can be considered as a constraining
factor of keyed hash-based architectures (and symmetric-key based proposals
in general) if an exhaustive search in the database must be avoided, which is
advisable when the number of users is large. Otherwise, if full unlinkability
is required, even at a higher computational cost, the proposed solution can be365
implemented.
Finally, we note that the 5G-AKA protocol also leaks the HN of the UE
(in the clear within the SUCI packet), as this information is required for SN to
route the packets correctly. This means that even using public key cryptography,
avoiding any kind of linking is sometimes very hard to achieve in practice.370
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4.5. Forward Secrecy
Both Braeken’s protocol and the 5G-AKA protocol ensure the confidentiality
of KSEAF even when the session keys of previous or subsequent sessions gets
compromised (SG3, cf. Section 2.2). However, they do not address forward
secrecy, which provides confidentiality assurances for the session keys when the375
long-term key is compromised. The importance of forward secrecy is recognized
in the literature (e.g., [9]), and in particular with protocols intended for IoT
devices.
As previously, we shall first describe a forward secrecy attack on the Braeken
protocol and then propose a solution that is resistant to such attack. The attack380
of the adversary involves the following four steps:
1. Eavesdrop on the exchanged messages of a session i of Braeken’s AKA
protocol between the target UE and HN, and store:
Synchronised mode: [ai, bi, hi, αi, βi, ηi, µi],
De-synchronized mode: [ai, bi, yi, zi, hi, αi, βi, ηi, µi].385
2. Get access to the private data on the USIM card of UE: (id,K, c, n).
3. Compute the sequence number ni for session i:
Synchronised mode: compute h∗ ← h(K, id, c, ai, bi, j) for j= n−1:−1:1
until h∗ = hi; then ni ← j.
De-synchronized mode: ni ← zn ⊕ h(K, yn ⊕ an ⊕ id, yn)390
4. Compute the i-th session key: KiSEAF ← h(K,αi ⊕ c, ηi, µi, ni + 1).
To guarantee forward secrecy, the long-term key must be updated with each
protocol execution. Consequently, in the proposed solution, the static key K
is replaced with a dynamic key KFS that is updated with each iteration of the
protocol using the one-way hash function h: KFS ← h(KFS). The security395
of this solution relies on the non-invertibility of h. Thus, an adversary that
gets access to KFS will not be able to recover the session key of a previous
communication, as the key KiFS used for its computation is different from the
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currently stored key in the USIM (KjFS = h
(j−i)(KiFS) for j > i), and it is
not possible to obtain previous values from current values, given that h is a400
one-way function. On the other hand, since UE authentication is implicit and
subject to replay attacks, to prevent synchronization problems, HN has to keep
the previous version K∗FS until it checks that this has been correctly updated by
UE. Only then, this value is updated. This also implies an extra check with this
previous value when the last updated value is not valid. The complete details405
on the implementation of this solution are given in the next section, where the
enhanced protocol is described.
5. An enhanced version of the symmetric-key AKA protocol that
supports forward secrecy
5.1. Description of the modifications410
Figure 4 describes the enhanced version of the protocol. The modifications
are highlighted in the figure and described in the following paragraphs. The
descriptions are ordered according to the convenience, in our opinion, of their
implementation.
Mod 1: Forward-secrecy support by replacing the static key K with a dynamic415
key KFS. To prevent synchronization problems, the values stored by the
parties are different; HN stores the pre-updated value, K∗FS , whereas
UE stores the updated value, KFS = h(K
∗
FS).
UE side: The key KFS is used to compute hn for the first flow. If
the second flow is received and the last verification is correct (β′ = β),420
then KFS is updated.
HN side: There are two main differences. First, the check that
the received message is correct is carried out using the updated/current
value (h(K∗FS)), and the stored/previous values (K
∗
FS) of KFS . Second,
HN updates KFS if, and only if, the checks are correct for the updated425
value, since this implies that UE has already updated it.
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Figure 4: The enhanced Braeken AKA protocol with forward-secrecy.
Note that the solution implemented here protects previous session keys
KSEAF but the fact that certain parameters, such as c and id, do not
change in each session makes subtler forward-secrecy attacks against pri-
vacy are still possible. More specifically, an adversary who manages to430
compromise a device and get access to the information stored in it, can
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determine if the device was involved in a previous eavesdropped com-
munication. Preventing this requires a more complex protocol redesign
that faces the, already discussed, inherent trade-off between privacy and
availability.435
Mod 2: Randomization of an, bn in the first flow to get full-unlikability. In
contrast to the approach used in the previous section, to implement
the enhanced protocol, we propose using c, instead of K, for masking.
This reduces the computations when combined with forward-secrecy
protection since using KFS would require checking two possible masked440
values (the pre and the updated value). Additionally, to reduce the
communication overhead, only one random number is generated and
transmitted.
UE side: A new random number R is generated and used to mask
the original values: a∗n = an⊕h(c,R) and b∗n = bn⊕h(c,R⊕ id). Then,445
these new values together with R replace an and bn in the first flow.
HN side: For every id∗ in its database, HN computes
c∗ ← h(km, id∗) and checks for a match:
id∗ = a∗n ⊕ h(c∗, R)⊕ h(km, a∗n ⊕ h(c∗, R)⊕ km ⊕ b∗n ⊕ h(c∗, R⊕ id)).
If a match is not found, the message is discarded. Otherwise, the original450
values an and bn are retrieved, and the protocol can continue as in the
original protocol.
Mod 3: Equalization of message formats and inclusion of a counter to prevent
LFM attacks. As in the previous case, to reduce the computation and
communication cost, the value c is used, instead of K, to check the455
communication mode (synchronized or de-synchronized). A counter
cnt is also included at the UE side to determine the operation mode.
UE side: Two new values, A and B, are generated with the
bitlength of yn and zn, respectively: A = T [h(c, a
∗
n)] and B a random
bitstring. The counter cnt is increased with every session and is only460
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reset to zero when the protocol is completed successfully (β is checked
correctly).
HN side: Determine if the received message corresponds to a syn-
chronized or de-synchronized type by checking if the third field matches
T [h(c, a∗n)]. If it does, HN assumes the synchronized mode. Otherwise,465
HN assumes the de-synchronized mode and the third field equals yn.
5.2. Security Analysis
Threat Model. We use the standard model for semantic security in which all
parties, including adversaries, are represented by probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) Turing machines (algorithms) [22]. Adversaries control the network and470
can eavesdrop on the communication (passive adversaries), as well as intercept,
inject, manipulate or drop messages (active adversaries). Security is based on
indistinguishability. In particular, an adversary cannot distinguish a pseudo-
random bitstring from a uniformly random bitstring of the same length s with
non-negligible probability, where negligible means less than 1/p(s), p any poly-475
nomial.
The Braeken protocol uses a keyed hash function h(K,x) : {0, 1}s×{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n, n = p(s), as a pseudorandom function (PRF). The input to h is a
uniformly distributed key K ∈ {0, 1}s, and a bitstring x of arbitrary length. We
call s the security parameter, and a computation (algorithm) efficient, or feasible,480
if it runs in polynomial time in s. We shall assume that: (a) the value h(K,x)
can be efficiently computed given K,x, and (b) the function h(K, ·) cannot be
efficiently distinguished from a uniformly random function R : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n,
given access to pairs (xi, h(K,xi)), where xi can be adaptively selected by the
distinguisher.485
We shall also use h as a cryptographic hash function h(x) : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
Such functions: (a) can be computed efficiently, (b) are one-way: that is given
y ∈ {0, 1}n it is infeasible to find x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that y = h(x), and (c)
are collision-resistant: that is it is infeasible to find inputs x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with
x 6= x′ such that h(x) = h(x′).490
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We shall first prove the unlinkability of the enhanced Braeken AKA Protocol,
based on the pseudorandomness of the exchanged messages.
Theorem 1. An adversary A cannot distinguish the messages exchanged dur-
ing the enhanced Braeken AKA protocol from uniformly random messages with
probability better than negligible (in terms of the length of the key K).495
Proof. We first prove the result for the first flow (Lemma 1) and then for the
second flow (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. An adversary A cannot distinguish the messages exchanged in the
first flow from uniformly random messages with probability better than negligible.
Proof. In the first flow the messages 〈a∗n, b∗n, A,B, yn, zn, R, hn〉 are exchanged.500
We must show that these are pseudorandom and (mutually) independent. R,B
are uniformly random numbers. For the remaining messages, pseudorandomness
and independence are guaranteed for each session provided that the keyed hash
functions:
h(c,R) for a∗n
h(c,R⊕ id) for b∗n
T [h(c, a∗n)] for A
h(K, rn, yn) for zn
h(K, id, c, an, bn, n) for hn(synchronized)
h(K, id, c, an, bn, n, zn) for hn(desynchronized)
have fresh inputs and are pseudorandom. We get freshness because the same505
input is not repeated within the same session and at least one of the terms:
R, R ⊕ id, a∗n, rn, n and n, respectively, is refreshed. We get pseudorandom-
ness because in each input there is at least one value: c, c, c, K, K and K,
respectively, that serves as a key (not known to A). For a∗n, b∗n we note that
pseudorandomness and freshness is preserved when XORing with a fixed num-510
ber. The pseudorandomness and freshness of yn comes from the uniformly
random number rn. It follows that the messages exchanged in the first flow are
pseudorandom and independent.
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Lemma 2. An adversary A cannot distinguish the messages exchanged in the
second flow from uniformly random messages with probability better than negli-515
gible.
Proof. This is similar. In the second flow 〈α, β, η, µ〉 are exchanged. The pseu-
dorandomness and freshness of α = c⊕ fn+1 comes from the uniformly random
number fn+1. The pseudorandomness and freshness of
β = h(KSEAF , an+1, bn+1, id, c), η = h(fn+1, c) and µ = h(c, fn+1)⊕ bn+1,
is a consequence of using the (secret) key values KSEAF , c and c, respectively,
and the fresh random numbers an+1, fn+1 and fn+1 respectively, as inputs to
the keyed hash function.
Corollary 1. An adversary A cannot link the messages of the same UE for two520
different sessions of the enhanced Braeken AKA protocol, as it is infeasible for A
to distinguish such messages from uniformly random messages with probability
better than negligible.
We next prove the security of the protocol against forward-secrecy attacks.
Theorem 2. An adversary A with access to the information stored on the tag525
and the messages from previously exchanged flows, cannot compute the previous
session keys with probability better than negligible.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume A can compute the session key of a previous
session i: KiSEAF , using the messages exchanged in that session and infor-
mation stored on the tag. This means that A can either predict the output530
KiSEAF of a pseudorandom function without knowing the key K
i
FS , or compute
the key KiFS given the information stored on the tag with probability better
than negligible. The former contradicts the pseudorandomness of the function
KiSEAF = h(K
i
FS , ·), while the latter contradicts the one-wayness of the hash
function h, since if the dynamic key stored on the tag is KjSF , j > i, then we535




Three main modifications have been described in this section. However,
it may not be advisable to implement all of them. As security experts know,
security features are rarely realized “for free” and typically incur a cost in terms540
of hardware, communication and/or computational load. Consequently, the final
design criteria and security features must depend on the specific application, the
efficiency requirements, and the required security level. Considering that each
case must be analyzed separately, we briefly review the proposed modifications
and provide brief guidelines for their implementation.545
1. Original Protocol. The protocol proposed by Braeken, taking into account
the limitations of symmetric-key cryptography, obtains a good balance be-
tween privacy and efficiency. Designers must nevertheless be aware of its
security limitations, which have been discussed in this paper. Addition-
ally, for practical implementations, the logic to select the operation mode550
must be addressed. If no extra security features are going to be included,
this could be implemented by using Failures Messages sent by HN (as in
the 5G-AKA), or using counters as discussed in the enhanced version of
the protocol. The second option is necessary if protection against LFM
attack is required.555
2. Original protocol + Forward Secrecy. This is the optimal balance be-
tween security and efficiency for lightweight applications. IoT devices are
particularly vulnerable to forward secrecy attacks, and consequently, this
security feature is remarkably advisable. It does not have any extra com-
munication cost and the computational cost is negligible.560
3. Original protocol + Forward Secrecy + Full Unlinkability. As proved in
this paper, the current version of the Braeken protocol does not provide
full unlinkability, but just session unlinkability. The modifications needed
for full unlinkability and protection against LFM attacks should be im-
plemented jointly, since each one of these features impacts on the other.565
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However, the cost for full unlinkability is high and could compromise avail-
ability, making the protocol vulnerable to DoS attacks (trade-off between
privacy and availability). This vulnerability is proportional to the size of
the database in HN (number of registered users), so that we only recom-
mend this modification if full unlinkability is an essential feature for the570
specific implementation and the database is not large.
6. Conclusions
The solution proposed by 3GPP for 5G wireless networks regarding sub-
scriber privacy relies on the use of a public key (of HN) that allows UE to
encrypt the subscriber’s identity. A detailed analysis of the recently proposed575
Braeken protocol has shown that this protocol cannot provide the same privacy
protection level as the 5G-AKA protocol because of its use of symmetric-key
protection. The Braeken protocol is also shown to be subject to LFM attacks.
We have shown that it is possible to achieve full unlinkability and overcome
LFM attacks with symmetric-key protection but at the cost of a trade-off be-580
tween privacy and availability, which could make the protocol vulnerable to
DoS attacks. However, having slightly lower subscriber privacy protection is
compensated by a much more efficient protocol, particularly considering IoT
devices. 5G wireless technology aims to support future IoT communication
with its mMTC service. IoT devices store secret information in their SIMs,585
which are supposed to be tamper-resistant. Nevertheless, such information can
be compromised, particularly with IoT applications that use low cost cards with
weak protection. In such cases, protection against forward secrecy is advisable.
We have proposed an enhanced version of the Braeken protocol with mod-
ifications that address forward secrecy, by updating the shared key after each590
successful authentication, as well as modifications that address the previous
mentioned security requirements: unlinkability, protection against LFM attacks
and a logic for the selection mode. These modifications are flexible and may be
applied selectively. We have also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
25
the proposed modifications from a system design perspective that considers the595
essential features of a specific implementation, including the cost for the service
provided, the efficiency and the security.
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